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I. - INTRODUCTION 
As part of the Catalan Self-Determination Referendum Law, the Generalitat of 
Catalonia convened a self-determination referendum that was held illegal on 1st 
October 2017. As a result, the President of the Generalitat of Catalonia, Carles 
Puigdemont, proclaimed and, at the same time, suspended the Catalan Republic in a 
declaration delivered on 10th October in the Parliament of Catalonia. 
The next day, the Spanish Government, under the presidency of Mariano 
Rajoy, asked the President of the Generalitat to clarify whether that declaration was a 
unilateral declaration of independence, and after not responding clearly, the Cabinet 
agreed on a set of measures to intervene Catalonia under the application of article 155 
of the Spanish Constitution. Those measures were approved by the Senate on 27th 
October, while at the same time the Catalan Parliament proclaimed the Catalan 
Republic. That same night, Mariano Rajoy decided to remove the Government of the 
Generalitat and dissolved the Parliament of Catalonia and called Catalan regional 
elections on 21st December. 
These events were the inspiration to investigate the background of article 155 
of the Spanish Constitution, taking into account that the Spanish Constitution is directly 
inspired by other European Constitutions, such as the German Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz) or the Italian Constitution. Accordingly, it seemed interesting to know 
how the direct rule, or other similar federal control institutions, are regulated by other 
Constitutions, as well as in what cases it had been applied. This investigation led to the 
discovery of what happened up to thirty times in Northern Ireland since 1972 and 
before the devolution agreements with the direct rule.  
Throughout this paper we will deal with a current issue in our legal-political 
panorama, the direct rule, but which also enjoys a long legal tradition in the legal 
systems of the non-centralised States. We will divide the work in two parts, at the 
beginning we will address the regulation of the direct rule and other similar institutions 
in other legal European systems from which inspiration has been taken for our well-
known article 155, such as Italy, Austria, Switzerland and Germany. This later already 
contemplated in its 1815 Constitution a federal action against the Member State that 
did not fulfil its federal obligations. In the second part, as the main topic of this work, we 
will develop the two cases of this century, in which the direct rule has been put into 
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practice as an instrument of control. We will analyse, from a legal point of view, the 
suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly, which has been agreed up to four times 
since the enforcing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998, also known as the Good Friday 
Agreement, during the Tony Blair’s term that led to the Parliament of Westminster to 
exert the direct rule for a five years period. As well as what happened recently in our 
country with the unilateral declaration of independence of Catalonia, back in October of 
2017 and the decision of the Spanish Government to apply article 155 of the Spanish 
Constitution. Both are examples of the exercise of a power of control that Governments 
hold to face two different situations that have put the rule of law in check.  
II. - THE DIRECT RULE 
 Before getting started with the main subject of this paper, it is necessary to 
explain what is meant by direct rule and when it is used. 
1. - Definition 
 The direct rule is closely linked with the protection that the Federation offers in 
order to restore the public order or the validity of the Fundamental Rights. The direct 
rule is an action against an offender Member State, that intervention is made at the 
request of a Member State, or is promoted by the Federation, when the Member State 
is unable to or does not ask for it1. 
 The direct rule, originally, appears in the Constitution of those Decentralised 
States as a prerogative of the central power to safeguard the common interest and the 
public order, as well as the rights of citizens and the Constitution, undertaking all the 
actions that the Constitution contemplates to do so, when one of the Decentralised 
States fails to comply with its obligations and duties. In other words, the direct rule 
consists of the suspension of the self-government that the Decentralised States enjoy, 
which means that the Central State itself assumes the powers granted by the 
Constitution and the Acts to the non-complying Decentralised State. 
 All in all, the direct rule is an instrument held by the Central State to protect the 
Public Order, the Fundamental Rights and the Constitution when one of the 
Decentralised States Acts against them. 
                                                          
1
 GÓMEZ ORFANEL, G. ‘La coerción federal en el Derecho comparado’. Cuadernos de 
Derecho Público. September-December 2005. Issue 26. Page 46. Available at: 
https://revistasonline.inap.es/index.php?journal=CDP&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=7
66 
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2. - The Direct Rule in Comparative Law 
After this first approach, we will analyse the legal systems of different States 
that include the direct rule in their Constitutions.  
2.1. - Italy 
Prior to 2001, the Costituzione only assigned full competence in matters of local 
legislation to those Regions that enjoyed a special status, those special Regions are 
Sicily, Valle d’Aosta, Sardinia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino-Alto Adige (article 
116)2. 
In 1999, Italy, like other States with regional entities, incorporated some legal 
techniques of the federal control models3, and on this matter article 126 of the 
Costituzione disposes that: 
'With a motivated decree of the President of the Republic, the 
dissolution of the Regional Council will be arranged and the dismissal of the 
President of the Giunta who have carried out Acts contrary to the Costituzione 
or serious violations of the law. Dissolution and dismissal may also be arranged 
for reasons of national security. The decree will be adopted after hearing a 
commission of deputies and senators established, for regional matters, as it is 
stipulated by the law...'.  
In addition, with the reform of the Constitutional Act of 18th October 2001, new 
powers were introduced for all the Regions, both ordinary and special, in administrative 
area and regulatory authority, thus granting more autonomy to the Regions and their 
Local Governments. However, the Corte Costituzionale, in its judgement 303/2003 
emphasizes the unitary character of the State and the subsidiarity of the powers 
attributed to the ordinary Regions4. Additionally, a new paragraph was added to article 
120 of the Costituzione, establishing for the first time something very significant, the 
possibility that the Government could replace regional authorities in case of breach of 
International Acts and Treaties, or of European Law, of serious danger for the integrity 
                                                          
2
 Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana, 22nd December 1947. Gazzetta Ufficiale, 27th 
December 1947, Issue 298. Available at: 
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/dettaglio/codici/costituzione 
3
 GÓMEZ ORFANEL, G. op. cit. Page 52.  
4
 SCHILLACI, A. ‘El sistema constitucional de Italia’. Revista de Derecho Constitucional 
Europeo. 2010. Issue 14. Page 109. 
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and public safety, or when the preservation of the legal or economic unity requires it 
and in particular the safeguard of the basic levels of the benefits relative to civil and 
social rights, without taking into consideration for it the territorial limits of the bodies of 
Local Government5. 
In this case, we are faced with a substitutive direct rule for reasons of breach of 
legal duties, but also for other matters that are not completely specified by the 
constitutional text, leaving a large list of possibilities for its enforcement. Something 
very similar to what happens in the case of the Spanish Constitution, which will be 
addressed later. 
If the Regions, which have been granted the power to participate in the 
elaboration of the European Union normative Acts, fail to comply with their obligations 
derived from international and European Acts, the State may also make use of the 
power of substitution (article 117.5). For this case, the Act 131/2003 of 5th June 2003, 
known as legge 'La Loggia', provides with the procedure to carry out the substitution. 
This Act expressly refers to the substitution as a remedy for the violation of the Law of 
the European Union, and establishes an emergency procedure that simplifies the 
procedural guarantees (article 8.2 and 4)6. The practice of the substitution powers, 
whether carried out either by the Government of the Republic or by the appointment of 
an ad hoc Commission, should preserve the principles of proportionality, loyal 
collaboration and subsidiarity. 
2.2. - Austria 
 Since 1920, article 100 of the Austrian Federal Constitution (Österreichische 
Bundesverfassung) regulates the dissolution of the Parliament of the Länder 
(Landtage): 
                                                          
5
 GÓMEZ ORFANEL, G. op. cit. Page 53.  
6
 Legge 5 giugno 2003, n. 131. Gazzetta Ufficiale, 10th June 2003, Issue 132. Available at: 
http://www.normattiva.it/atto/caricaDettaglioAtto?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2003-06-
10&atto.codiceRedazionale=003G0148&queryString=%3FmeseProvvedimento%3D6%26formT
ype%3Dricerca_semplice%26numeroArticolo%3D%26numeroProvvedimento%3D131%26testo
%3DLegge%2B5%2Bgiugno%2B2003%252C%2Bn.%2B131%26annoProvvedimento%3D2003
%26giornoProvvedimento%3D5&currentPage=1 
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'Every Landtag can be dissolved by the Federal President on the motion 
of the Federal Government with the assent of the Bundesrat. The assent of the 
Bundesrat is decided in the presence of one-half of the members and with a 
majority of two thirds of the votes cast. The representatives of the Land, whose 
Landtage is to be dissolved, may not take part in the voting'7.   
The aforementioned precept has not been subjected to substantial 
modifications, but one of the few changes introduced is very remarkable. According to 
the Bundesverfassung, the dissolution of the Landtage can only be ordered once for 
the same reason. After the dissolution of the Landtage, new elections must be 
scheduled within three weeks.  
The Bundesverfassung does not limit the cases by which the Landtage can be 
dissolved, having said that we must remember that the Länder do not have powers 
beyond those that the Acts have not attributed to the Federal Government, so their 
powers are limited to the reform of their own Constitutional Acts with a majority of two 
thirds of the votes cast. The Federation plays a dominant role in the Austrian political 
system8. Consequently, the state constitutions are limited to making a catalogue of 
express references on the basic principles of the  democratic and social rule of law, on 
the exercise of certain rights and fundamental freedoms, on provisions relating to 
population, territory, capital, headquarters of the institutions, symbols of the Land and 
clauses protecting the linguistic minorities, as well as their political institutions, local 
organization or election of the members of the Bundesrat; these Acts must respect the 
Bundesverfassung and the treaties of the European Union9. Taking all this into 
account, we can conclude that the infringement of these supra-Land Acts will cause the 
dissolution of the Landtag. 
                                                          
7
 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz, 1st October 1920. Bundesgesetzblatt, 2nd January 1930, Issue 
1/1930. Available at: 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=BgblAlt&Dokumentnummer=bgb1930_0001_
00001 (English version) 
8
 BUSSJÄGER, P. ‘Between Europeanization, Unitarism and Autonomy. Remarks on the 
Current Situation of Federalism in Austria’. Revista d'estudis autonòmics i federals. 2010. Issue 
10. Page 33.  
9
 DE CUETO NOGUERAS, C. ‘La organización territorial del Estado Austríaco: ¿un caso de 
regionalismo o federalismo unitario?’ Revista de estudios regionales. 2001. Issue 60. Pages 
122-123. 
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2.3. - Switzerland 
 As in Austria, Switzerland is a Federal State composed by twenty six Cantons 
that enjoy, according to the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, of certain 
autonomy since they are able to take on all those powers that the Constitution has not 
expressly conferred to the Federal Assembly. Therefore, the Grand Conseil of each 
Canton will be able to legislate on those matters that are not granted to the Federal 
Assembly, always bearing in mind that Cantonal Law cannot contain stipulations that 
are contrary to Federal Law.  
As a consequence, in Swiss Constitutional Act, the institution of the Federal 
Inspection (Bundsaufsicht) holds a central position. The Federal Inspection is the non-
jurisdictional activity through which the Federation makes sure that the Cantons apply 
the Federal Law, known as federalism of execution. The Swiss legal system also 
includes the legal concept of the Federal Execution (Bundesexecution), and both legal 
institutions are often confused. In general terms, the Federal Inspection is the ordinary 
and continuous procedure of federal control, while the Federal Execution requires that 
a Canton obstinately refuse to comply with the requirements that the Federation has 
made10. 
The Swiss doctrine11 bases its distinction on the legal instruments used by both 
institutions. Thus, substitution would be the usual instrument to proceed in cases of 
Federal Intervention, while the quashing or annulment would be used for Execution. 
The Execution, whose exercise is attributed by the Constitution to the Federal 
Assembly (article 173.1.e)12, is an instrument that is rarely used because it is 
considered much more important and dangerous for federal harmony. On the contrary, 
the Federal Council, as the highest executive authority of the Federation (article 174), 
is competent to ensure compliance with Federal Law (article 186.2 and 4) which is a 
more common activity. 
                                                          
10
 GÓMEZ ORFANEL, G. op. cit. Page 55. 
11
 BURCKHARDT, W. Kommentar von Bundesverfassung. Bern. Stämpfli. 1914. Page 685. 
FLEINER, F. Scweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht. Tübingen. Mohr Siebeck. 1923. Page 63. 
HANGARTNER, Y. Grundzüge des schweizerischen Staatsrechts. Zürich. Schulthess. 1980. 
Pages 86-87. 
12
 Constitution Fédérale de la Confédération Suisse, 18th April 1999. Recueil Officiel du Droit 
Fédéral, 11th August 1999, Issue 1999 2556. Available at: 
https://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/c101.html  
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2.4. - Germany 
 Already at the time of the Deutscher Bund (1815-1866) the institutions of 
Federal Intervention (Bundesintervention) and Federal Execution (Bundesexecution) 
were contemplated in the legal system. The first one was to be understood as the aid 
of the Federation to a Member State threatened by actions contrary to the Constitution. 
The Federal Execution, on contrary, was the action by the Federal Assembly for the 
adoption of necessary measures to address the breach of the founding agreements by 
a Member State13. 
With the elaboration of the Weimar Constitution, the institution of the Federal 
Execution was reintroduced and, also, extraordinary powers were granted in this matter 
to the President of the Reich. According to article 48 of the Weimar Constitution:  
'If any Land does not fulfil the duties imposed upon it by the Constitution 
or the Acts of the Reich, the Reich President may enforce such duties with the 
aid of the armed forces. 
In the event that the public order and security are seriously disturbed or 
endangered, the Reich President may take the measures necessary for their 
restoration, intervening, if necessary, with the aid of the armed forces. For this 
purpose he may temporarily abrogate, wholly or in part, the fundamental 
principles laid down in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153. 
[...]'14. 
The premise to proceed to the intervention was the unfulfilment of the duties 
imposed by the Constitution and the Federal Acts. The Constitution did not refer to 
every single obligation assumed by the Land, but only to those obligations derived from 
Land`s position as a Member State of the Federation as a consequence of its 
subordination and incoordination to the Reich. It would be the President of the Reich 
who would decide on the existence of a violation of these duties, without prior 
involvement of the Courts. The decision should immediately be submitted to the 
Reíchstag. As a body of political control, it had the power to require the President to 
rescind the measures taken. In addition, the Land could go to the State Court 
                                                          
13
 GÓMEZ ORFANEL, G. op. cit. Page 55. 
14
 Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs, 11th August 1919. Reichsgesetzblatt 1919. Issue 
1383. Available at: http://www.verfassungen.de/de/de19-33/verf19-i.htm (English version) 
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(Staatsgerichtshof) as a competent authority to hear about legal-public facts at issue 
between the Länder or between the Reich and a Land, corresponding to the President 
of the Reich the enforcement of the judgement15. 
Article 48.1 of the Weimar Constitution refers to the armed force as the 
procedure to enforce compliance with the legal system, however this is the most 
extreme means. There are, also, other actions that the President can promote, such as 
the suspension of the authorities of the Land, the appointment of commissioners, etc.  
With the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949, and 
continuing with the German constitutional tradition, the institution of Federal Execution 
(Bundeszwang) is incorporated again in article 37:  
'(1) If a Land fails to comply with its obligations under this Basic Law or 
other federal Acts, the Federal Government, with the consent of the Bundesrat, 
may take the necessary steps to compel the Land to comply with its duties. 
(2) For the purpose of implementing such coercive measures, the 
Federal Government or its representative shall have the right to issue 
instructions to all Länder and their authorities'16. 
 It should be noted that, in addition to the institution of Federal Execution, two 
other are regulated, which also entail federal control over the Länder and from which it 
must be differentiated. This two institutions are the Federal Supervision 
(Bundesaufsicht) and the Federal Intervention (Bundesintervention), regulated in 
articles 84 and 91.2 of the Basic Law, respectively. According to the Basic Law, the 
Federal Supervision is the faculty that Federal Government holds to supervise the 
implementation of the federal Acts by the Länder. The Basic Law considers the Federal 
Intervention as a power of the Federal Government to submit to its authority the police 
forces of a Land when it has no possibilities or is unwilling to face a danger that 
                                                          
15
 ANSCHÜTZ, G. Die Verfassung des deutschen Reichs. Berlin. Georg Stilke. 1921. Pages 
269-275 
16
 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 8th May 1949. Bundesgesetzblatt, 23rd May 
1949. Available at: https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/se/index.php?sid=164ed98ccb88ac6b0af099234b42baf0&navi=1&subnavi=50
&anr=80201000 (English version) 
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threatens the rule of law of the Federation or of the own Land, being able, in turn, to put 
under his orders, if necessary, the police forces of other Länder17. 
 Regarding the Federal Execution, also known as Federal Coercion, it is an 
instrument with a clear aim since the Federation is granted the power to ensure if 
necessary through force, the application of the Basic Law and the other Federal Acts 
by the Länder. 
 The coercive actions of the Federation must meet two requirements, a formal 
one and a material one. Under the material premise, prior to the Federal Intervention, 
there must be a breach of the federal obligation by a Land. Such breach must be 
objective, regardless of the intentionality or not of the Land. Besides, the unfulfilment 
can occur due to either active or omissive behaviour. Another important element is that 
the action or the omission must be attributable to a Land as a federated entity, and not 
to one of its lower entities or other dependent territorial administrations (municipalities, 
Kreise or districts)18.  
 The failure to fulfil the obligations does not have to be express, but it can be 
inferred from the interpretation of the Constitution or the Federal Acts. In addition, it 
may be the breach of duties arising from the principles of unity and loyalty, which are 
the basis on which Germany it is constituted as a Federal State, the cause of the 
Federal Intervention. Either way, the obligation must be of a legal-public nature, that is, 
it must be an obligation that corresponds to the Land because of its status as an 
integral part of the German Federal State. Thus, the non-compliance of legal-private 
obligations assumed by the Länder are excluded from the federal control19.  
 Furthermore, the Federal Coercion is a subsidiary instrument, so that the 
coercion can only be used when the compliance with the corresponding obligations can 
not be demanded from the Land in a less cumbersome way, especially the judicial 
ones. Although it is implicit that before enforcing this exceptional mechanism, all the 
channels of dialogue, negotiation and agreement must have been exhausted20. 
                                                          
17
 ARROYO GIL, A. ‘Unidad, lealtad y coerción federal (o estatal) en Alemania y España’. 
Revista Jurídica Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. 2015. Issue 31. Page 61. 
18
 Ibídem. 
19
 Ibídem.  
20
 ARROYO GIL, A. op. cit. Pages 61-62. 
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With regard to the formal basis, it should be noted that this refers to the two 
branches of the political power, executive and legislative, since it requires the 
intervention of both the Federal Government and the Bundesrat through the approval of 
different resolutions21.  
Three are the steps that the Federal Government must follow to apply the 
Federal Coercion. First, the Federal Government must verify the existence of a federal 
obligation and that this has been infringed by a Land. The Land can appeal to the 
Federal Constitutional Court the Federal Government’s resolution, questioning both the 
existence of that obligation and, in case of recognition of its existence, that a breach 
has occurred.  
In a second stage, the Federal Government will issue another resolution stating 
its decision to implement the corresponding coercive action, in order to force the Land 
to comply with the federal obligation. In this resolution, the Federal Government must 
determine what will be the concrete means it will carry out for that purpose.  
The first resolution of the Federal Government has a legal nature, hence it can 
be appealed at the Federal Constitutional Court. The second one, however, has a 
political nature, being left to the discretionarily of the Federal Government, without it 
being able to be revised later in the jurisdiction22. 
Finally, it is the turn of the Bundesrat, which must approve, by absolute 
majority, a third resolution in which it will give or not, totally or partially, its consent both 
to the Federal Government’s decision to take the coercive measures, and to the 
concrete measures in which the coercive action consists.  
The Basic Law does not refer to the specific coercive measures, and, given that 
to date a procedure of this importance has never been activated, we do not have 
constitutional jurisprudence that can serve as a guide to know what must be done. 
What is clear is that, whatever the measures adopted, based on the principle of federal 
loyalty (Bundestreue), they must respect the principles of suitability and proportionality 
that derive from it.  
                                                          
21
 Ibídem Page 62. 
22
 Ibídem. 
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It is also evident, since this is clear from the Basic Law, that it is strictly 
prohibited to use the Federal Army by the Federation in cases of federal coercion, 
because, as stipulated in article 87.a.2 of the Basic Law, the Federal Army can only be 
used outside the State and in defence of those cases in which the Constitution so 
expressly provides. By not making article 37 reference to this measure it is understood 
that it does not fit for Federal Coercion. 
2.5. - United Kingdom 
The Parliament of the United Kingdom has granted powers, through each of the 
devolution agreements held in 1998, to Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for 
Wales, the Northern Ireland Assembly and the London Assembly and their associated 
executive bodies. Nevertheless, this devolution may be suspended and replaced by 
direct rule by the Government of the United Kingdom, exercising the strong hegemony 
of the English centralism23.  
As a result of the principle of supremacy of Westminster, the legislator provided 
certain control mechanisms of the new Parliaments and Assemblies. The main control 
mechanism corresponds to the Courts, although other means also exist24. 
The first of these controls consists of the attribution to the Presiding Officer of 
the function of ensuring that any legislative proposal presented at the Assemblies falls 
within the competence framework attributed by the different devolution agreements. 
Secondly, four weeks have passed since the adoption of the act in the Parliament until 
it can be subject to the royal assent. During this period, the act is paralyzed and may 
be challenged before the Judiciary Committee of the Privy Council because it is 
understood that the entire bill or any of its provisions fall outside the competence of the 
Parliament. Likewise, the Government of the United Kingdom can interfere directly in 
the legislative action of these entities through the Ministers for Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. These Ministers must avoid submitting a bill to royal assent when they have 
reasonable doubts about whether the bill is violating international agreements or 
overstepping the attributed powers25. 
                                                          
23
 BOMBILLAR SÁENZ, F. M. ‘El sistema constitucional del Reino Unido’. Revista de Derecho 
Constitucional Europeo. January-June 2011. Issue 15. Pages 169-173. 
24
 CANTERO MARTÍNEZ, J. ‘La devolución de poderes en el Reino Unido: tres modelos 
diferentes de descentralización para Escocia, Gales e Irlanda del Norte (1)’. Revista de 
administración pública. May-August 2001. Issue 155. Page 378. 
25
 CANTERO MARTÍNEZ, J. op. cit. Pages 378-379. 
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In the case of Northern Ireland, it is also possible that the Westminster 
Parliament itself, at the request of the Minister for Northern Ireland, carries out a 
previous control to the royal assent. In this case, the Assembly is obliged to present the 
act at the Parliament, so that within twenty days, it will rule on the matter. If after this 
period, none of the Houses has objected or rejected the motions, the bill may be 
submitted to the royal assent. If by the urgency of an act this can not be submitted to 
the control of the Parliament, a posteriori control of the act can be carried out, being 
able to leave it without effect if one of the Houses considers it opportune through an 
Order in Council26.  
On the other hand, the Government of the United Kingdom has the power to 
revoke the rules of the territorial Ministers by Order and to compel the Ministers to 
adopt statutory instruments when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
rules of the Ministers may be incompatible with an international obligation. In the case 
of Northern Ireland, the Government of the United Kingdom can not only nullify the Acts 
of the Northern Ireland Assembly, but can also adopt all the necessary measures to 
prevent the act from having legal effects27. 
Finally, judicial control is another of the mechanisms established by the 
legislator to guarantee respect for the division of powers. This control falls on the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
Exceptionally, the Government of the United Kingdom can use the direct rule as 
a control mechanism. 
Direct rule occurred in Northern Ireland from 1972 to 1998 during the Troubles, 
and for shorter periods of time between then and 2007. At that time, major policy was 
determined by the British Government’s Northern Ireland Office, under the direction of 
the Secretary of State of Northern Ireland. Daily matters were handled by Government 
departments within Northern Ireland itself, and Northern Ireland continued to elect 
members of parliament to the Parliament of the United Kingdom as regularly. 
Afterwards, we will analyse more in depth what the direct rule supposed. 
                                                          
26
 Ibídem Page 379. 
27
 Ibídem. 
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2.6. - Spain 
Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution incorporates what in other Federal 
States is known as Federal Coercion or Federal Execution, which is influenced, 
although with some differences, by article 37 of the German Basic Law that regulates 
the institution known as Bundeszwang28. This mechanism of extraordinary and 
exceptional control29 has nothing to do with the ordinary control procedures that article 
153 provides, as in other States in which it is regulated, had never been used, so there 
is no precedent or a development act that contemplates the scope and requirements of 
such a measure. 
According to article 155 of the Spanish Constitution:  
 ‘1. If an Autonomous Community does not fulfil the obligations imposed 
upon it by the Constitution or other Acts, or Acts in a way seriously prejudicing 
the general interests of Spain, the Government, after lodging a complaint with 
the President of the Autonomous Community and failing to receive satisfaction 
therefore, may, following approval granted by an absolute majority of the 
Senate, take the measures necessary in order to compel the latter forcibly to 
meet said obligations, or in order to protect the above-mentioned general 
interests. 
 2. With a view to implementing the measures provided in the foregoing 
clause, the Government may issue instructions to all the authorities of the 
Autonomous Communities’. 
 In order to activate the measures in which the direct rule can be materialized, 
three conditions are necessary. Firstly, there must be an action or omission. Secondly, 
the action or the omission must be imputed to an Autonomous Community as a 
political-territorial entity. And thirdly, the breach of the constitutional or legal obligations 
must be effective30. Although it is not determined what kind of breach should be.  
 The Spanish Constitution does not regulate the procedure that must be followed 
for the exercise of the direct rule, although it can be deduced some steps to follow.  
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 After the assessment of the infringement, the first step the Government must 
take is to send to the President of the Autonomous Community whose actions are in 
question a written request. This document constitutes the last warning to the non-
compliant Autonomous Community, in this way the Autonomous Community is granted 
the opportunity to cease its conduct31. As for as the form and the period of time 
available to the President of the Autonomous Community to respond to the request, the 
Constitution does not establish anything. Although in relation to the content of the 
requirement nothing is established either, in opinion of GIL-ROBLES the Government 
must state in the requirement the specific measures that intends to adopt32. 
 Article 189 of the Senate Regulations establishes the processing of the 
concession to the Government by this House of the authorization to adopt the 
measures in which the direct rule will consist: 
‘1. If the Government, in the cases contemplated in article 155.1 of the 
Constitution, requires the approval of the Senate to adopt the measures to 
which it refers, it must present before the President of the Chamber a written 
document in which the content and the effects of the proposed measures is 
manifested, as well as the justification of having made the corresponding 
request to the President of the Autonomous Community and of its non-
compliance. 
2. The Senate assembly shall send said document and attached 
documentation to the General Commission of the Autonomous Communities, or 
it shall proceed to constitute a joint Commission in the terms provided in article 
58 of these Regulations. 
3. The Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of article 67, will 
require, through the President of the Senate, the President of the Autonomous 
Community so that within the term established, he will send as many details, 
data and arguments as he deems pertinent and so that designate, if it deems 
appropriate, the person who assumes the representation for these purposes. 
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4. The Commission will formulate a reasoned decision on whether or not 
the approval requested by the Government should proceed, with the conditions 
or modifications that, where appropriate, are pertinent in relation to the 
proposed measures. 
5. The Plenary will submit this proposal to debate, with two shifts in 
favour and two against, of twenty minutes each, and the interventions of the 
Spokesmen of the Parliamentary Groups that request it, for the same time. 
Once the debate has concluded, the proposal submitted will be voted on, and 
the favourable vote of the absolute majority of senators is necessary for the 
approval of the resolution’. 
As a result, the Government of Spain must request the Senate's approval on 
the measures in which its action will consist within article 155. To do so, the 
Government must address a letter to the President of the Senate detailing the 
measures to be applied and must also supply with the written request that was made to 
the President of the Autonomous Community and his disagreement response. 
The Senate must send all the documentation to the General Commission of the 
Autonomous Communities or form a joint commission among the members of the 
political parties of the Senate and study the acceptability and suitability of the proposed 
measures, and may submit amendments to them. The Commission in charge must 
request the President of the Autonomous Community to come to the Commission and 
present the appropriate allegations. The President of the Autonomous Community can, 
in any case, delegate his representation to another member of his Government. 
Once all the information has been collected, the Commission must issue a 
reasoned decision on the acceptance of the measures, their suitability, duration and 
may introduce the pertinent amendments to the Government's proposal. 
Finally, the resulting package of measures must be submitted to vote in plenary 
session of the Senate, where it must be approved by an absolute majority. 
Later on we will address the unilateral declaration of independence of Catalonia 
as the starting point for the application of article 155 and the measures that have been 
taken under the shelter of this legal institution. 
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III. - ENFORCEMENT OF THE DIRECT RULE 
1. - The suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly: the direct rule from 
Westminster 
1.1. - Territorial allocation of power in the United Kingdom: the devolution 
agreements 
 The United Kingdom is not a Federal State, even though the reforms introduced 
in recent years, especially in 1998, as part of the devolution settlements, make it 
resemble a Quasi-Federal State. In spite of being a unitary State, the United Kingdom 
is formed by four nations (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) with a 
different linguistic-cultural background, so in this sense we could speak of a 
plurinational State33.  
 Despite this situation, the United Kingdom has always been a centralised State 
in which England has exercise its hegemony over the other nations. But the demands 
and nationalist claims of the other nations led to reform the allocation of power.  Within 
this context, decentralisation was carried out following the technique of devolution, as a 
result the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act were approved in 1998. 
These nations were endowed with self-government institutions with their own 
competences. The administrative organization of the central Government was adapted 
to this new constitutional scenario, since part of the powers of the latter were assumed 
by the new national institutions of self-government. The devolution was conceived as 
the proper way to preserve the unitary State, and at the same time satisfy the 
nationalist claims of Welsh and Scots that arose from the seventies34. The devolution it 
is not a way of federalism nor does it suppose a distribution of the sovereignty of 
certain powers not reserved exclusively to the State, but these competences are under 
a constant supervision by the State, and the State has the prerogative to revoke them 
at any time.  
While the devolution operated in Wales is characterized by having a much more 
executive or administrative role35, in the case of Scotland has operated a model called 
retaining statute, which is characterized by the specification of the subjects and 
competences that are retained by the Parliament of Westminster, leaving those that are 
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not expressly established in the hands of the Scottish Parliament. This implies the total 
freedom to enact laws except, logically, on those matters that have been reserved to 
the Parliament of Westminster, for example: Constitution, Crown, succession to the 
throne, Parliament of the United Kingdom,...36. A very similar model was used for 
Northern Ireland, but unlike Scotland it has not had the opportunity to develop the 
competences granted as a result of the various suspensions of autonomy since 199837, 
as we will address later. 
1.2. - The direct rule origins: the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 
1972  
 The system of the direct rule was originally introduced on 28th March 1972 
under the terms of the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972 to face the 
Northern Ireland conflict. The Act took effect immediately on receiving the royal assent 
on 30th March 197238. Until then, Northern Ireland had powers transferred under The 
Government of Ireland Act 1920, this included the existence of an Executive and a 
Parliament of its own, with limited powers due to the unlimited supremacy of the 
Parliament United Kingdom39. 
 According to the Act, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would assume 
three important executive roles under the Stormont regime: the Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland was going to assume all the functions which used to belong to the 
Governor of Northern Ireland, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland and the Minister of 
Home Affairs (article 1.1.a)40. 
 The Attorney General for England and Wales was to take over the duties of the 
Attorney General for Northern Ireland (article 1.2)41. 
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 Finally, the Parliament of Northern Ireland was indefinitely prorogued, with its 
legislative powers being made available for exercise by the British Government by 
Order in Council, now the British Government could make Acts for any purpose for 
which the Parliament of Northern Ireland had power to legislate (article 1.3)42. 
 The direct rule was seen as a temporary measure, with a power-sharing 
devolution preferred as the solution to the conflict. Consequently, the Government of 
the United Kingdom granted a legislature Assembly for Northern Ireland through the 
Northern Ireland Assembly Act 1973, for this reason, elections for the Assembly were 
called for on 28th June 1973, the Assembly was constituted on 31st July 197343.  
However, all the political institutions that were put into abeyance by the 
Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972 were formally abolished by the 
Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 and the institutions remained in the hands of the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Attorney General for England and 
Wales, except for the Parliament of Northern Ireland that became competence of the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland44. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
could delegate to the Assembly those legislative powers that he considered 
appropriate. 
A power-sharing Executive was established following the Sunningdale 
Agreement that took place on 21st November 197345. Finally, the Executive and the 
Assembly were again abolished in July 1974, as they both collapsed with the 
resignation of the Chief Executive46.  
Different attempts to implement, unsuccessfully, a power-sharing Executive and 
devolved Government took place during the following years until the Belfast Agreement 
was reached in 1998. 
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1.3. - The Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland Act 2000 
 On 10th April 1998, the Belfast Agreement took place, which would be the 
greatest exponent of devolution of powers of the nineties. In this case, the legislator 
uses the transferring statute system to carry out the return of powers. In this model, 
each and every one of the competences that would be assumed by the assembly was 
explicitly expressed, leaving the rest of matters not specified for the Westminster 
Parliament47. It was established that both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the 
Executive would enjoy full legislative and executive powers in all matters that until then 
had been the responsibility of the Secretary of State and the governmental 
departments for Northern Ireland (strand one)48. A unique form of devolution was 
introduced in 1999 following the Good Friday Agreement based on a compulsory 
power-sharing between the unionist and republic communities49. This scheme was 
based on the need to obtain nationalist consent (article 16.3)50 so that the institutions of 
the new dispensation are consociational at both legislative and executive levels, with a 
stipulation that public power must be exercised in accordance with the principle of 
‘parity of esteem’ between unionist and republicans (article 17.5)51.  
 However, and despite its similarity with the distribution of powers with those 
established in the Federal States, it must not be forgotten that the process of 
decentralization that took place did not affect in any way the unity of the State and the 
supremacy of the Parliament of Westminster, so Westminster could suspend the return 
of powers52. 
 As part of the Northern Ireland devolution process, on 25th June 1998 elections 
to the Northern Ireland Assembly took place. On 1st July 1998, all the political parties 
who had won seats during the Northern Ireland Assembly election took their places in 
the new Assembly Chamber at Stormont. The Assembly met in 'shadow' form as 
powers had not yet been devolved. But it was not until November 1999, that the House 
of Lords and the House of Commons decided, within the context of the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998, that it was time to fully devolve the powers to the Assembly of 
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Northern Ireland and end the direct rule of Westminster. On 2nd December 1999, the 
direct rule came to end as the powers were returned to the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
However, this self-government was not meant to long last.  
 On 11th February 2000, as a consequence of the lack of consensus to carry out 
the decommissioning of weapons to the IRA established in the Belfast Agreement, the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, suspended the Assembly and the Executive, 
and reimplemented the direct rule of Westminster. The secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland could order the restoration of the Belfast Agreement, once the behaviour that 
produced the suspension had been reviewed. In this sense, the members of the 
Executive and the Assembly would resume office, unless they were no longer eligible53. 
On 30th May 2000, the Government of the United Kingdom restored the devolution to 
the Northern Ireland Assembly and the power-sharing Executive.  
 On 1st July 2001, the First Minister of Northern Ireland and Leader of the Ulster 
Unionist Party, David Trimble, resigned. Prior to his resignation, and foreseeing the 
chaos that would arise to elect his successor, he asked Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to 
suspend the Assembly and other institutions from the Belfast Agreement and once 
again implement the direct rule of Westminster54. We should point out that the 
procedure of the Northern Ireland Assembly allowed for a six-week period during which 
a new First Minister and Deputy First Minister would have to be elected otherwise new 
elections to the Assembly would have to be called. At first, it was decided that the 
Assembly itself was going to elect a new First Minister, however time passed and no 
agreement was reached. As a result, on 10th August, the Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland announced the suspension of the Assembly until a new Executive was 
agreed upon. The suspension lasted twenty-four hours and it was successfully restored 
on 11th August. Six weeks later, on 21st September, the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland suspended the Assembly for twenty-four hours after a failure to break the 
deadlock and reinstate a First Minister.  
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1.4. - The suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly (2002-2007) 
 During the previous eleven months, the Assembly worked normally. But after a 
police search in the offices of Sinn Féin, a party that was part of the Executive along 
with the Unionists, the Unionist refused to share power with Sinn Féin.  As a result, on 
14th October, the Secretary of Northern Ireland suspended the Northern Ireland 
Assembly for the fourth time since the Belfast Agreement. The Northern Ireland Office 
took over the assembly’s departments and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
became the acting First Minister. All the legislations that were under consideration by 
the Assembly passed to Westminster and took the form of Order in Council. The 
Assembly was formally dissolved on 28th April 2003 in anticipation of an election in May 
2003, but the Secretary of State decided to postpone the election and it eventually took 
place on 26th November 2003. However, the Assembly was restored to a state of 
suspension following the November 2003 election and since January 2004, political 
parties have been engaged in a review of the Belfast Agreement aimed at restoring the 
devolved institutions.  
During the period between restoration of the direct rule in October 2004 and the 
re-transfer of powers in May 2007, several attempts to revive the devolution took place, 
including the Joint Declaration (May 2003), the Comprehensive Agreement (December 
2004) and finally the St. Andrew’s Agreement (October 2006). Given that all hinged on 
IRA decommissioning and an end to associated criminality, the Unionist party and the 
Sinn Féin began to work together with a commitment to repeal the Government of the 
United Kingdom’s direct rule55.  
Following the passing of the Northern Ireland Act 2006 the Secretary of State 
created a non-legislative fixed-term Assembly, whose membership consisted of the 
members elected in the November 2003 election. This met for the first time on 15th May 
2006, its remit was to make preparations for the restoration of devolved Government to 
Northern Ireland and for a fully restored Assembly. 
1.5. - Northern Ireland (St. Andrew’s Agreement) Act 2006 
 The St. Andrews Agreement of 13th October led to the establishment of a 
transitional Assembly, formed by the members of the current Northern Ireland 
Assembly, whose aim was to take part in the preparations of the restoration of the 
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devolved Government in Northern Ireland. The Agreement marked a series of 
deadlines for the devolution. First of all, it was demanded that all the political parties 
that wanted to be part of the Northern Ireland Assembly accept the terms of the St 
Andrews Agreement for 10th November. Acceptance did not have to be expressed, 
since neither the Unionists nor the Sinn Féin did so, but it was said that there was 
enough endorsement from all parties to carry on with the process. Secondly, on 24th 
November the Assembly should nominate candidates for First Minister and Deputy 
First Minister. On 30th January, the Assembly was dissolved and elections were call on 
7th March 2007. The end of the direct rule was scheduled for 26th March, however, if 
the ministerial offices were not fill to that date, the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland could dissolve the Assembly and the St. Andrews Agreement would fall56.   
 As of March 25, Sinn Féin and the Unionists had not reached an agreement, 
and the deadline was about to expire at midnight on the 26th, they requested a delay to 
the British Government. On 27th March, the Parliament of Westminster introduced 
through the emergency legislation the modification of Northern Ireland (St. Andrews 
Agreement) Act 2006 and granted them six-week delay57. 
 Since the St. Andrews Agreement the Government of the United Kingdom has 
no longer the power to suspend the Assembly, except in exceptional cases and with a 
previous emergency legislation (article 4)58. 
2. - The launching of article 155 of the Spanish Constitution for Catalonia 
 In the first place, it must be remembered that there is nothing established as to 
what the measures adopted by the Government should be. So it is possible that the 
Spanish Government, unlike what is established in the German Basic Law, can make 
use of the Armed Forces if there is no other solution59. 
 On 10th October 2017, the President of the Generalitat of Catalonia declared 
Catalonia's independence, but at the same time he suspended the independence. As a 
result, on 11th October, the President of the Government of Spain sent a request to the 
President of the Generalitat of Catalonia to clarify whether he had made a unilateral 
declaration of independence or not. 
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The request gave a deadline of five days to give an affirmative or negative 
response, considering that the absence of response or any answer that was not 
affirmative or negative, would suppose the confirmation of the declaration of 
independence. Also, in the event that the declaration of independence was confirmed, 
including the case of absence of response or that the answer was not clear, a new 
period of three additional days was given to revoke that declaration and restore the 
constitutional order. 
Since the President of the Generalitat refused to respond clearly to the request 
of the national government on two occasions, the Council of Ministers, on an 
extraordinary session on 21st October, considered the request as not attended and 
agreed on measures that would be proposed for approval in the Senate. 
The proposed measures were based on four goals: the return to legality, the 
restoration of normalcy and coexistence, economic recovery and the holding of 
regional elections. These measures can be divided into four groups according to the 
subject matter, these groups are: government and administration; security, economic 
management and communications; Catalonian Parliament; and transversal measures. 
The measures on Government and Administration granted the authorization to 
the Government of the Nation to dismiss the President of the Generalitat of Catalonia, 
the Vice President and the rest of the members of the Catalan Government. Their 
functions would pass to the organs or authorities that were created for that purpose or 
that the Government designated.  
The President of the Government was given the power to dissolve the 
Parliament of Catalonia. As a consequence, elections would be convened within a 
maximum period of six months after the implementation by the Senate of the set of 
measures in which the application of article 155 would consist. The elections would be 
held, according to the electoral act, fifty four days after the elections have been called. 
The administration of the Government of Catalonia would continue to operate, 
but under the directives of the bodies or authorities created or designated by the 
Government, which would be mandatory for all staff. The designated body could agree 
on the appointment, termination or temporary replacement of any authority, public 
office and personal of the administration, as well as those of any agencies, entities and 
other related or dependant organs, and its public sector business. 
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In relation to security, economic management and communications, the 
authorities appointed by the Government would take command of the Mossos 
d'Esquadra, it would also be agreed the deployment of the State Security Forces in 
Catalonia and the replacement of Mossos if necessary. 
The exercise of the necessary economic, financial, tributary and budgetary 
competences would correspond to the Government, who would guarantee that the 
State funds corresponding to the Community and the income that it collects would not 
be destined to activities related to the secessionist process. 
The Government would also assume the Centre for Telecommunications and 
Information Technologies and the Centre for Information Security of Catalonia. In the 
field of the public autonomous service of audio-visual communication, it would 
guarantee the transmission of truthful, objective and balanced information, respectful of 
political, social and cultural pluralism, which would imply the intervention of the Catalan 
Audio-visual Media Corporation. 
Regarding the Catalonian Parliament, it would be prohibited from appointing a 
new President of the Generalitat until a new Parliament emerged from the polls. Nor 
could it hold investiture sessions or propose any candidate for any position. This 
prohibition would also be extended to the control role that the Parliament of Catalonia 
over the Government, nor could it adopt initiatives contrary to the Constitution and the 
Statute.  
With the application of the measures would be declared the nullity and lack of 
any effect of the provisions, Acts and autonomic resolutions issued by both Parliament 
and the Generalitat that contravene the measures agreed by the Senate. 
The aim of the transversal measures was to impose disciplinary sanctions on 
the officials or labour personnel of the Generalitat of Catalonia who did not comply with 
the measures, without prejudice to inform the Prosecutor's Office. All Acts, actions, 
resolutions and provisions necessary to ensure compliance with the measures could 
also be adopted. 
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Initially, the maintenance of the measures would take place until a new 
Government of the Generalitat took office, resulting from the holding of the 
corresponding elections to the Parliament of Catalonia. The measures that are 
authorized by the Senate, would take effect from the moment of its publication in the 
Official State Gazette. 
The calendar for the proceeding of article 155 in the Senate was as follows:  
On 24th October, the Senate commission was formed by twenty seven 
members of the different parties, except for representatives of Ciudadanos. 
On 26th October. The Generalitat of Catalonia had until 10 am to present 
allegations and appoint a representative, however the Generalitat of Catalonia sent the 
certified fax with the allegations three minutes later than the maximum deadline, and 
was registered in the Senate at 10:23. Despite the delay, the allegations were 
admitted. 
The allegations consisted of a nine-page letter in which Carles Puigdemont 
accused the central Government of having exceeded, with the proposed measures, the 
limits allowed by article 155. In this letter he claimed that with the application of the 
measures an already complex and extraordinary situation was aggravating because 
the Spanish Government was taking away Catalonia's political autonomy.   
The Senate committee approved with 22 votes in favour, 5 against and no 
abstention the provisional text of the measures proposed by the Government of Spain. 
Likewise, it rejected the allegations of the Generalitat. An amendment of the Socialist 
Party, in favour of the gradual implementation of the measures, was accepted. Other 
two amendments by the same party remained pending for the plenary session that 
would take place the next day; one with the possibility of halting the 155 measures if 
there was a call for early elections by the President of the Generalitat, an amendment 
that was withdrawn after the unilateral declaration of independence was presented for 
voting in the Parliament of Catalonia; another concerning the control of TV3 and the 
Catalan public media, which was accepted at last minute by the Senate in plenary 
session. 
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On 27th October, the Senate plenary session, after a long debate, approved the 
authorization to apply the agreed measures with 214 votes in favour; 47 against; and 
one abstention. In parallel, the Parliament of Catalonia held another plenary session in 
which a unilateral declaration of independence was approved to constitute a Catalan 
republic as an independent State. 
After the approval in the Senate of the measures proposed by the Government 
and the unilateral declaration of independence made in the Parliament of Catalonia, the 
President of Spanish Government convened an extraordinary Council of Ministers, and 
at the end, announced the approval of five Royal Decrees. In them the following 
provisions were established: First, the dismissal of the President of the Generalitat, 
Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó60. Second, the dismissal of all the members of the 
Catalan Government, including the Vice President, Oriol Junqueras i Vies61. Third, the 
assumption of the powers of the Catalan Offices by the corresponding Ministries. The 
President of the Government, Mariano Rajoy, and the Vice President of the 
Government, Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría, assumed the functions and competencies 
that corresponded to the President and Vice President of the Generalitat of Catalonia 
respectively, although the President of the Government delegated all the functions of 
the President of the Generalitat as well in his Vice President62. Fourth, the abolition of 
the Offices of the President and the Vice-President of the Generalitat, of the Advisory 
Council for the National Transition, of the Special Commission on the violation of 
Fundamental Rights in Catalonia, of the Council of Public Diplomacy of Catalonia and 
of all the Delegations of the Government of Catalonia the Government of Catalonia, 
with the exception of the European Union delegation63. Finally, the Parliament of 
Catalonia was dissolved and regional elections were call on 21st December64. 
Also that night, the Home Minister, Juan Ignacio Zoido, as head of the Catalan 
Home Office dismissed the Major of the Mossos d’Esquadra, Josep Lluís Trapero65. 
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With the elections of 21st December, it was expected that the situation in 
Catalonia would change and a Government would be reinstated within the legality. 
However, to date Catalonia still has no Government and the direct rule is in force, 
because despite the fact that Ciudadanos won the elections, the separatist parties 
continue to have the majority of seats in the Parliament and they do not give up in their 
desire to establish the Catalan Republic.  
After the elections, the Catalan Parliament elected Roger Torrent, member of 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), as their new speaker. He proposed the 
former President of the Generalitat, Carles Puigdemont, who had fled to Belgium, as 
the candidate for re-election as President of the Generalitat. However, after the 
Constitutional Court ruled that Puigdemont could not assume the presidency from 
abroad, the Catalan Parliament delayed Puigdemont's investiture as he was facing 
arrest on possible charges of rebellion, sedition and misuse of public funds. Faced with 
this political deadlock, the other pro-independence leaders determined that the pro-
independence movement should outlive Puigdemont, so the former Catalan President 
announced on 1st March he would step his claim aside in order to allow detained 
activist Jordi Sànchez, from his Junts per Catalunya alliance, to become President 
instead. However, as Spain's Supreme Court did not allow Sànchez to be freed from 
jail to attend his investiture ceremony, Sànchez ended up giving up his candidacy on 
21st March in favour of former Catalan Government spokesman Jordi Turull, who was 
also under investigation for his role in the referendum. 
Turull was defeated in the first ballot of a hastily convened investiture session 
held on 22nd March, with only his Junts per Catalunya alliance and ERC voting for him 
and the Candidatura d’Union Popular (CUP) abstaining, resulting in a 64–65 defeat. 
The next day, and less than twenty four hours before he was due to attend the second 
ballot, the Supreme Court announced that thirteen senior Catalan leaders, including 
Turull, would be charged with rebellion over their roles in the 2017 unilateral 
referendum and subsequent declaration of independence. In anticipation of this ruling 
and in order to avoid appearing in court, Marta Rovira, ERC's general secretary and 
deputy leader to jailed Oriol Junqueras, fled the country to Switzerland. This prompted 
the Supreme Court to rule that Turull and several others would be remanded in custody 
without bail. As a result, the Parliament speaker Roger Torrent cancelled Turull's 
second investiture ballot. Turull's first ballot nonetheless started the clock towards 
automatic parliamentary dissolution, meaning a new regional election would be called 
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for 15th July if no candidate was elected as President of the Generalitat before 22nd 
May. 
After these events, the Parliament speaker, Roger Torrent, called a new 
investiture session on 13th April with the aim to elect Jordi Sànchez as President, 
however the Supreme Court refused, once again, to release him from prison. This 
session was postponed. 
Finally, on 10th May the former President of Catalonia, Carles Puigdemont, 
appointed Quim Torra, a member of his political party, as the temporary President of 
Catalonia. In consequence, the Speaker of the Parliament proposed him as the new 
President of the Generalitat. The first investiture session was held on 12th May, in order 
to invest Quim Torra as the new President of Catalonia, his appointment had to be 
agreed by an absolute majority. As he did not pass the first investiture session, a 
second round was called on 14th May. At the end of the second voting session, Quim 
Torra was appointed President of the Generalitat by the Parliament. 
According to the text approved by the Senate back in October, the application 
of article 155 would end once the new Government for Catalonia had taken office. 
However, the Spanish Government has decided to stop the direct rule, but they are 
retaining the control of the accounts of the Generalitat, with the aim of preventing public 
funds from being used to defray the expenses to make the Catalan Republic effective. 
Moreover, the central Government does not rule out the return to the direct rule if the 
new Catalan executive declares, once again, the independence of Catalonia. 
IV. - CONCLUSION 
The direct rule does not follow the same pattern in all the legal systems in which 
it is contemplated, since as we have seen it sometimes serves to replace a Regional 
Government and at other times its final objective is the convening of regional elections. 
In any cases, one thing is clear, as we have seen, the direct rule is an institution 
with a long legal tradition, especially in federal countries, and which has been brought 
to our legal system as a way to deal with serious threats to the rule of law. It is an 
exceptional method of control held by the Government of the Federation that must be 
applied in those cases in which there is a serious and repeated breach of the 
obligations imposed by the Constitution and the Acts, thus violating the harmony of the 
State. And that should only be applied ultimately, when all the ordinary control 
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mechanisms provided by the legal order have not been sufficient to end with the failure 
of the decentralised State. 
As we have seen, since this measure is so special, the legal systems do not 
foresee the cases in which it must be applied. And in the Spanish and Italian cases, a 
clear and specific procedure is not regulated in this regard, Germany, on the other 
hand, has a very clear procedure in case it were the case of having to apply article 37 
of the Basic Law. 
In the case of Northern Ireland, the direct rule has been used as a mechanism 
to combat terrorism and negotiate in the peace process. Although it should be noted, 
that the British Government could make use of it, for any reason regarding the other 
Nations since it has always been an institution created to its measure according to the 
case.  
However, I think that nowadays to keep the direct rule as it was originally 
conceived has no meaning. Lately, the British Government uses the direct rule as a 
threat instrument to deal with situations of political deadlock that take place in the 
Parliaments or Assemblies, especially in Northern Ireland. I think that now the direct 
rule is more an instrument that the British Government wants to use in order to get 
back to the English centralism. It is well known that the British Government tends to 
force agreements between the main political parties of Northern Ireland by threatening 
to reinstate the direct rule. In this way, the political parties are dissuaded from 
remaining in a deadlock on a subject that is discussed within the Northern Ireland 
Parliament. Recently, we have the example of the disagreements with budgets of 
Northern Ireland. The Sinn Féin and the DUP did not reach an agreement regarding 
the budget for 2019, and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland gave them four 
weeks to present to the executive of Theresa May a proposal of budget for next year. If 
they could not reach the agreement, the Secretary of State would proceed to establish 
the direct rule on budgetary matters and call new elections. I believe that the direct rule 
should not be used for this purpose, but that other more appropriate mechanisms 
should be used, since the direct rule was an instrument to combat terrorism and 
prevent the IRA from taking over the Northern Irish institutions. It should also be the 
Parliament of Northern Ireland itself that establishes a procedure to avoid 
parliamentary deadlocks, they could adapt, for example, the Basque investiture system 
that prevents the repetition of elections and transferring it to other situations of possible 
political deadlocks. 
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 In my opinion, the direct rule should be used for those cases where the rule of 
law is at great danger as a consequence of repeated non-compliance with 
constitutional obligations or it has already been violated. The aim of the direct rule 
should be the holding of elections to Parliament, but before these elections take place 
those politicians or political parties that promote the infringement of the Constitution 
should be declared ineligible by the Constitutional Court as the guarantor body of the 
Constitution and the Fundamental Rights. And in the last resort, if the new Government 
continues to fail to comply with the constitutional obligations, the central power would 
suspend the decentralized State self-government, leaving in the hands of the Central 
State all the competencies that would have been attributed to the decentralised State. 
In addition, the direct rule, in the case of the Spanish Constitution, has been 
conceived as a deterrent measure, and I deeply believe that as such it is useless, since 
the lack of development content is not clear what should be the scope of this. In my 
opinion, for the direct rule to be satisfactorily applicable, it is necessary the elaboration 
of an act that develops the aspects related to the content of the direct rule. This act 
would have to thoroughly establish the situations in which the direct rule would be 
enforced. It also needs to be regulated the entire procedure the Government must 
follow when the direct rule is about to be enforced. This act should include a list of 
measures that can be taken under the direct rule, depending on which of the 
prearranged situations the country is. This type of act is necessary, not only in Spain, 
but also in those legal systems that as the Spanish one do not have the direct rule 
developed. 
Although we cannot compare what happened in Northern Ireland and Catalonia, 
since they are two different legal-political contexts, we can say that the direct rule has 
been used with the same objective, to return to the political and social normality of both 
territories and reinstate the rule of law. Although I think that in the case of Catalonia, 
the Government was in a state of denial and did not see the problem that was within 
Catalan society and if it had acted earlier it would not have had to apply the direct rule 
and it would have been enough to renegotiate a new Statute of Autonomy. One of the 
main reasons why the independence movement has taken root at a political level, 
especially, in relation with the political party that was part, at the time, of the Catalan 
Government, was the refusal by the central Government to negotiate a new Statute of 
Autonomy for Catalonia. Before the independence movement spread within the 
Catalan Government, which had traditionally been characterized by being conservative 
and monarchical, they had elaborated a new Statute of Autonomy in which Catalonia 
tried to assume new competences, mainly in Tax Office. In addition, the Catalan 
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Government also intended to provide the Public Treasury with a lower amount of 
money, and also wanted to be granted an economic concert, similar to that of the 
Basque Country. The denial of those competences, made the political party that was in 
charge of the Catalan Government enrol in the independence movement. If a package 
of proposals to improve the situation in Catalonia had been presented by the 
Government of Spain in time, the enforcement of article 155 would never have 
happened. And the victimisation of the Catalan leaders at the moment for the 
independence itself would have been rather more difficult.  
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